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APPROACH, CONCEPTS, AND
METHODS
1. Coverage of the Study: Countries and Period
The criteria used for selection of countries for observation are dic-
tated by the purposes of the over-all study. They must be large coun-
tries in terms of size of international transactions: if implications for
the international monetary system as a whole are to be drawn, it is
obviously more practical to concentrate on countries whose impact on
this system is large. Preferably, the countries should also resemble the
United States in structure and circumstances. For these reasons, the
study is planned to cover the major trading, industrial countries com-
monly known as the "Group of Ten." (For reasons which will be ex-
plained later, however, one member of the group—Canada----will be
excluded.)
The countries which will eventually be covered conduct, in their
aggregate, an overwhelming share of world trade and other interna-
tional transactions, own an overwhelming share of the world's capi-
tal, hold most of the world's international liquidity, and produce
most of the world's income. Conclusions which are valid for these
countries as an aggregate are thus applicable, by and large, to the in-
ternational monetary system as a whole.
The period selected is that following World War II. The experi-
ence of earlier periods is not entirely irrelevant, but of less immediate
application to current issues and to problems which are likely to be
faced in the near future.' The earlier postwar years of 1945—49 were
1Theexperience of earlier periods has been investigated in two well-known studies
whose methods are similar in essence to the one adopted here, although confined
primarily to observations of a single policy variable. The interwar period was the
topic of Ragnar Nurkse's classic study, International Currency Experience (League of
Nations, 1944), where this method of investigation was followed in Chapter IV. The
prewar period was studied in Arthur 1. Bloomfield, Monetary Policy under the Gold
Standard: 1880—1914 (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1959), particularly Chapter
V. These studies will be referred to later.6 Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Policies
excluded too, on similar grounds. Circumstances in those years were
definitely unique; although one cannot safely predict that they may
not recur, it seems quite evident that such repetition is not likely in
the near future, so that any conclusions derived from the experience
of those years is bound to be of lesser importance for current eco-
nomic problems. The study thus starts with the year 1950 and ends
with the latest date for which information was available at the time
of its collection, which would usually be the end of 1965 or the be-
ginning of 1966.2
2. The General Approach
As indicated above, the study will seek to identify the policies fol-
lowed in various countries at times of imbalances of payments. It will
try to find what policy measures were commonly taken in such times,
and whether these could be expected to lead to balance-of-payments
adjustment. The study will hence attempt to establish probable rela-
tionships between the position of the balance of payments and the
policies undertaken: it will try to reveal the principles followed by
studying the actual behavior. The analysis will be of a statistical
nature.
It should be emphasized that the analysis is confined to the search
for causal associations in one direction: changes in the target variable
are the cause and changes in policy variables are the effect. Although
the study does not address itself primarily to the effect of policy
measures on the target, indirectly the findings may provide at least
some indication of the measure of success of the policies followed.
Knowing the typical policy patterns of governments, and comparing
them with the balance-of-payments experiences of the respective
countries, may provide some clues about the effects of policies on the
balance of payments. The international comparisons which will follow
the studies of individual countries may thus make some contribution
toward this end.
When a consistent relationship between the movement of a policy
variable and imbalances of payments is established, this finding will be
tentatively interpreted as an indication of a causal relationship. That
2Ina few instances, later data have been added to the study without being con-
sistently incorporated into the analysis.Approach, Concepts, and Methods 7
is, if a policy instrument reacts consistently to balance-of-payments
disturbances by moving in a certain direction, it will be assumed that
this is not a coincidence but that the reaction was causally related to
the disturbance, and is, therefore, conscious behavior on the part of
policy designers. An attempt will usually be made, in such a case, to
give a possible explanation for their conduct; that is,to see what
model, or analytical structure, could be expected to yield this pattern
of action. The models could, of course, be different for different coun-
tries—and in each country, for different periods or different govern-
ments. The study will thus not try to "impose" one model upon all
situations; nor will it try to assess the theoretical credibility of any
model which may be revealed. The purpose will be to establish what
policy makers may have wished and anticipated, rather than to evalu-
ate whether their actions were well-founded.
More generally, this study does not aim to pass judgment on the
actions of governments of the countries under investigation—either on
the targets they have been pursuing or on the means selected to
achieve them. True, in some final analysis, such a judgment must be
made. Studying past experience in order to improve future perform-
ance necessarily implies pointing out favorable and beneficial patterns
of behavior and setting them off from those which lead away from the
desirable goals. The present study, however, is viewed only as a pre-
liminary, necessary step in such an assessment; it is concerned only
with the attempt to find out what the policies actually were, rather
than with the subsequent question of which of these policies were
"good," or "bad"—and why. This definition of the subject matter of
the study probably cannot be overemphasized, particularly because
the analytical method may lead the unwary reader in the opposite di-
rection. The constant attempt to search for a positive relationship
between balance-of-payments disturbances and policy actions may
easily create the impression that the existence of such a relationship
is regarded favorably, while the lack of it is scorned. It should there-
fore be repeated that no such normative judgment is intended in the
present study.
The study's emphasis throughout will be on the relationship be.
tween policy instruments and the balance of payments. In addition,
however, a few other major economic targets will be observed. This
will serve two functions. One is to make certain that a consistent as-8 Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Policies
sociation between imbalances of payments and a certain policy vari-
able could not be attributed to the impact of another target variable.
To cite an obvious example: If the balance-of-payments surplus is
positively correlated with the rate of unemployment, measures taken
to relieve either unemployment or excess demand for labor, when in-
vestigated in isolation, would be erroneously interpreted as being in-
tended for the sake of balance-of-payments equilibrium. The other
purpose of observing competing target variables is to find out whether
the absence of a consistent relationship between the imbalances of pay-
ments and a given policy instrument could be due to the employment
of this policy instrument in the service of an alternative policy target.
It should be understood, however, that these are only auxiliary ob-
servations, not on a par—in the present study—with the direct investi-
gation of the relationship between policy instruments and balance-of-
payments disturbances. In other words, this study is not a general in-
vestigation of trade-offs among targets or of the over-all allocation of
policy instruments. It is designed specifically to observe reactions to
imbalances of payments; other policy targets are admitted only as a
means of ascertaining, and possibly explaining, the existence of cer-
tain reactions or their absence.
3. The Analytical Method
The basic information on which the analysis will rest consists of
quarterly data (adjusted for seasonal variations, where these are
found). Quarters have been selected, rather than months, for a num-
ber of reasons. Some data, mainly in the fiscal sphere but also on the
balance of payments, are usually available quarterly but rarely on a
monthly basis. Even when monthly data are available, their use and
manipulation would be highly cumbersome. Moreover, an important
consideration is the presumption that monthly data may reflect a
strong element of chance, erratic variations, whereas the aggregation
of data into quarters helps in smoothing out these random fluctua-
tions.
While the quarter is the basic unit for data compilation, the study
of interrelationships among variables within each quarter could hardly
be of great significance. The quarter is an arbitrary dissection ofApproach, Concepts, and Methods 9
thecontinuum of time. Changes in policy variables could easily be
due to movements of the policy targets in the previous quarter, or
even in still earlier periods. If these movements should change direc-
tion often from one quarter to another, observations of relationships
would be very likely to yield misleading results.
In recent years, a few attempts have been made to construct a "re-
action function" for various policy instruments by regression analy-
sis, using forms of distributed lags to take account of the problem just
cited.3 While an approach along these lines is conceivable, the ex-
tremely large measure of experimentation which would have been re-
quired for each country, among other things, would make this a much
too ambitious undertaking for the present study. It would, by its
character, also have one major drawback for the study's purposes: it
would cram the information about policy reactions into a single meas-
ure, without distinctions among chronological periods or between pe-
riods of upward and downward disturbances in the balance of pay-
ments.
Moreover, the explicit intention of the present study is to provide
qualitative, rather than quantitative, inferences about policy reactions.
Thus, for instance, the investigation will seek to learn whether the
discount rate is raised or lowered (or not changed at all) at times of
balance-of-payments deficits, rather than how much it changes in re-
sponse to a deficit of a given size.
As a device for suggesting hypotheses about policy reactions, sub-
periods of imbalances of payments are first distinguished. The unit of
observation for a study of policy reactions to balance-of-payments dis-
See G. L. Reuber, "The Objectives of Canadian Monetary Policy, 1949—61: Em-
pirical 'Trade-offs' and the Reaction Function of the Authorities," Journal of Political
Economy, April 1964, pp. 109—132; and William G. Dewald and Harry G. Johnson,
"An Objective Analysis of the Objectives of American Monetary Policy, 1952—61," in
Deane Carson (Cd.), Banking and Monetary Studies, Homewood, Ill., 1963, pp. 171—
189. A study devoted specifically to the length of the time lags which are involved in
policy reactions (as well as the lags between the taking of policy measures and their
impact upon the economy) is Albert Ando, E. Cary Brown, Robert M. Solow, and
John Kareken, "Lags in Fiscal and Monetary Policy," in Stabilization Policies, Com-
mission on Money and Credit, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963, pp. 1—163. Interesting
information about the time lags in policy reactions is contained in another recent
study, reflecting opinions about policy processes in approximately the same countries
which are investigated in the present study. See E. S. Kirschen et at., Economic Policy
in Our Time, Amsterdam, 1964, particularly Tables X.2 to X.5, pp. 274—276.10 Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Policies.
turbances is the time period during which the balance of payments is
continuously in deficit, or continuously in surplus. The term "con-
tinuously" should be interpreted in a liberal way: a divergence in
the direction of movement which occurs for a rather short time should
not be regarded as starting a new period, but as a random discrepancy
which may be disregarded. Needless to say, any such dissection of
time into periods involves some element of arbitrariness in determin-
ing precisely the points at which each period starts and terminates,
but this element will most often be rather slight.
The statistical investigation starts, then, with the observation of
relationships among movements of policy and target indicators within
each period. Had these periods been of very short duration, this pro.
cedure would hardly have been justified, for the same reasons that
apply to observations of individual quarters: the movement of policy
variables in any period is as likely to be a reaction to movements of
target variables in earlier periods as to developments of the current
one. Usually, however, the units of observation are considerably longer.
Periods defined in the way suggested here normally last from two quar-
ters to a number of years.
It may be assumed that when periods are of that length, policies
within each period are normally a reaction to developments within
the period rather than earlier. If this assumption is valid, an observa-
tion of concurrent changes in target and instrument variables would,
indeed, reveal causal effects of target changes on policies. It must be
recognized, however, that this is an assumption which, while probably
reasonable, is supported more by casual observations, statements of
policy makers, and general beliefs than by any firm analysis. More-
over, the procedure adopted here would be justified only if it could be
assumed that policy measures do not have a great enough immediate
impact on the target to reverse the direction of change which originally
gave rise to the policy action: if this is not so, associations of changes in
target and policy variables are more likely to reveal the effects of poi-
icies on targets than those of targets on policies. In other words, this
procedure requires that the "inside lag" (or "recognition lag") be
materially shorter than the "outside lag." There can, of course, be no
assurance that this assumption is generally valid; and it must he
recognized that whenever it does not hold true, the outcome of theApproach, Concepts, and Methods 11
present procedure may be doubtful. A related, somewhat similar, prob-
lem will be discussed later in this chapter.4
Where balance-of-payments disturbances follow a pattern approxi-
mating cyclical movements, this method of establishing relationships
among variables will be complemented by the reference cycle analy-
sis developed for the study of business cycles. In this case, the turn-
ing points in the balance of payments will serve as the "reference
4Thetime-lag problem is touched upon in the aforementioned studies of Nurkse
and Bloomfield. Both used annual data (and the year as a unit of observation) to
analyze the relationship between two variables: the central bank's domestic assets
and its foreign assets. Thus Nurkse wrote: "Our observations relate to yearly intervals.
It is possible that domestic assets may be adjusted in the same direction as changes in
international assets, not immediately, but with a lag of more than a year, in which
case the year-to-year figures might conceal a process of adjustment taking place on
the traditional lines. A lag in the process of adjustment is, after all, natural. Suppose
an expansion of domestic credit gets under way in some country; the central bank's
domestic assets increase while its international reserve is likely to fall, thus 'offsetting'
part at least of the rise in domestic assets. It may be only after some time—say two or
three years—that the central bank is 'pulled up short' by the fall in its international
reserve and that it may feel obliged to start contracting its domestic assets; and this
contraction, again, may go on for two or three years and is likely to be accompanied
by a return flow of gold and exchange reserves. In both the expansion and the con-
traction phase, domestic and international assets may thus move in opposite directions
from year to year, and yet the 'rules of the game' may operate, albeit with a lag."
(International Currency Experience, pp. 68—70.)
Similarly, Bloomfield said: "The period of a year that is the basis of our compari-
son is essentially an arbitrary one that may conceivably conceal the fact that domestic
assets did move more frequently in the same direction with international assets than
in the opposite direction, but with a lag of more than one year." Monetary Policy,
p. 50.
Nurkse and Bloomfield were worried by the possibility that central banks reacted
with a lag of a few years. From all available evidence, this does not seem to be a
matter of grave concern, Normally, central banks would probably react within a fairly
short time—certainly, it could be expected, less than a year. If they do not, this would
be an indication not of a slow machinery of response but of an intentional policy,
which should by no means be described as following some "rules" with a time lag.
Nurkse himself appears to suggest as much, in the sentence just following those
quoted: "It is not always easy to draw the line between such delayed adjustment and
deliberate neutralization with a view to avoiding adjustment." (International Cur-
rency Experience, p. 70.)
A much more important reason for the inadequacy of the use of annual data would
seem to me to be that a period as long as a whole year is most likely to contain move-
ments in opposite directions (in each variable) rather than a uniform movement, and
the averaging of these movements must detract seriously from the validity of the
investigation. Observations based on annual averages and on the year as a unit of
investigation are thus likely to be of a limited significance. The only case in which
this is less important is where the dominant movements took the form of rather long
cycles, with a considerable number of years within each stretch of the cycle.
'See Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles, New
York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1947, particularly Chapter 2.12 Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Policies
dates." In principle, this method should yield essentially the same
conclusions as that of observing subperiods of disturbances, since each
such subperiod will be approximately—although not precisely—a phase
of the reference cycle. This additional method of investigation may
help in revealing the degree of consistency of each relationship. It
may also uncover typical time lags between disturbances and reactions,
when such typical lags exist.
Conclusions derived from these observations would, to repeat, be
tentative. If an instrument (or policy) variable appears to move con-
sistently in the direction required for balance-of-payments adjustment,
it will be necessary to test whether this association may not be due to
the consistent association of balance-of-payments fluctuations with
the movements of another target variable, with which the changes of
the instrument variable on hand are genuinely associated. Also, when
instrument variables are seen not to move consistently with the bal.
ance of payments, or even to move consistently in a direction oppo-
site to the requirements for balance-of-payments adjustment, this will
require explanation. A few complementary methods of investigation
will be used to deal with these problems. Thus the possibility of an
association of the movements of an instrument variable with those
of an alternative target variable will be examined by looking at the
latter during periods of a uniform movement of the former. This may
also be done through the reference cycle analysis in two ways: first,
by taking as reference dates the turning points in the movements of
the policy instrument and examining movements of alternative target
variables during these cycles; second, by determining reference dates
according to turning points in the movement of a target variable and
observing the movements of instrument variables along these cycles.
Isolating periods in which the latter targets and balance-of-pay-
ments equilibrium called for opposite policies would, of course, make
it easier to distinguish reactions to balance-of-payments disturbances
from responses to changes in other targets. Unfortunately—for this
purpose, but not for policy makers!—the number of such episodes of
clear conflict has been rather small in the countries represented in the
present report. Although the small number of such cases observed
prevents a formal separate investigation of these episodes, special at-
tention will usually be drawn to them.
The combined use of all these methods should yield answers toApproach, Concepts, and Methods 13
the following questions: Which policy instruments were used for bal-
ance-of-payments adjustment? Which were not, or were even manipu-
lated in an opposite way to balance-of-payments requirements? Why
were the latter not used for balance-of-payments purposes; that is,
what other policy targets might have prevented the use of these instru-
ments for balance-of-payments requirements? The analysis should also
be able to show consistent differences among chronological periods in
each country; or consistent differences—if they exist—between periods
in which a correction of downward disturbances is called for and
periods in which upward disturbances had to be corrected.
By the nature of the study, the relationships revealed cannot usu-
ally be completely and definitely established. The number of observa-
tions in each country—recalling that the unit of observation is a pe-
riod of more or less monotonic disturbances—is necessarily small. It
may typically be not more than ten or twelve, and very often be con-
siderably less. The conventional methods of verifying the significance
of apparent relationships would thus be of very little help in the pres-
ent instance. Statements of conclusions must, then, involve an ele-
ment of judgment, and findings would have to be treated as plausible
implications of the evidence rather than as unchallengeable truths.
But that is, in varying degree, the nature of any empirical proposition.
A further elaboration of a few details in the techniques of analysis,
and a description of various shorthand symbols, will be found in the
chapter devoted to the experience of Japan (Chapter 3). The reader
is advised to refer to the study of Japan as, in part, an extension of
the present exposition of methods.
4. Adjustment Policies: Individual Variables
and Policy Patterns
In examining the policy reactions to imbalances of payments, a judg-
ment must be made as to whether a given change in a policy variable
is "adjusting"—that is, whether it has the nature of working toward
relieving the imbalance—or, on the contrary, "disadjusting." This
judgment has to be made on two different levels.
First, it may be asked whether the change in the policy variable, in
6Thisrefers also to the test of "indexes of conformity," which is used in cyclical
analysis. See the warning, thid., pp. 183—185.14 Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Policies
and by itself, has an impact in an adjusting direction: if it does it will
be termed "adjusting." Thus, when there is a downward disturbance
any change which tends to reduce aggregate demand or lower prices
is an "adjusting" change; this would include an increase of the dis-
count rate, n increase of minimum-reserve ratios, a decline of central
or commercial bank credit, and so on. Termiig suds achange"adjust-
ing" does not necessarily imply that the entire process of which this
changc is a part will have an adjusting effect. For instance, the discount
rate may be raised, but demand for commercial bank credit may in-
crease too, swelling credit volume and thus augmenting the balance-
of-payments disturl$ances; however, without the change in the discount
rate, the deterioration would have been even stronger, and thisis,
therefore, an "adjqsting" change in the discount rate,
Second, the pattern of behavior of the whole array of instruments
combined must be evaluated. Within this framework, what was termed
an "adjusting" change beorè may not be and vice versa. In other
words, when the qver-all pattern is examined, attention is focused on
the magnitude of some crucial variable. If this variable changes in an
adjusting direction, the policy pattern as a whole is adjusting. A
change in another variable which was found to be disadjusting when
examined in isolation may still be consistent with the adjusting change
in the cruc4l variable. To cite a simple example: Suppose the crucial
variable is deemed to be money supply; this variable could change in
an adjusting direction even though credit supply—which is only one
of the factors which create money—changes in a disadjusting direction.
The disadjusting nature of the xqyements of credit supply, when
judged by themselves, may then still be consistent with the adjusting
flature of the monetary policy. Judging the pattern as a whole would
thus require focusing attention on the "crucial" variable or variables.
This, indeed, whether explicitly or implicitly, has always been the
way adjustment policies have been analyzed.
It riay be worthwhile to discuss one particular pattern at some
length due tq its historical importance and its potential for analysis:
this is the model which came to be known as tile "rules of the game"
of the gold standard. The books of Ragnar Nurkse and Arthur I.
Bloomfield, which are often quoted and referred to in the present
study, assume a cCrtain definition of these "rules" in their examina-
tion of the degree of adherence of central banks to tJe gold-standardApproach, Concepts, and Methods 15
"rules of the game." The definition was provided by Nurkse; Bloom-
field seems to have followed it as a matter of convenience and for the
purpose of comparability, although he does not appear to regard it
as an exclusive definition.7 Nurkse defined the "rtlles of the game" in
the following way:
Whenever gold flowed in, the central bank was expected to increase the
national currency supply not only through the purchase of that gold but also
through the acquisition of additional domestic assets, and similarly, when gold
flowed out, the central bank was supposed to contract its domestic assets also.
in this way the influence of gold movements on the domestic credit base was
to be magnified, and magnified in accordance with the central bank's reserve
ratio.8
The "crucial" policy variable is, by this definition, the magnitude
of the central-bank's domestic assets. Only a few would be likely to
accept this definition in the extreme form in which it appears here.
The last sentence implies that the "rules" require central banks to
maintain a constant reserve ratio, i.e., of their foreign assets to their
liabilities (this would also imply a constant ratio of the central bank's
foreign assets to its domestic assets). While central banks were very
often—particularly before 1914—legally required to maintain reserve
ratios in one form or another, these were merely minimum require-
ments. Central banks were not bound by law to treat these ratios as
maximum ratios as well, and there are no indications that they re-
garded a stable (rather than a minimum) reserve ratio as a guideline
for their policy. Apparently, Nurkse himself did not consider this part
of his definition essential, since there is no mention of the banks' re-
serve ratios in his empirical examination of the behavior of central
banks.
But even deleting the last sentence from the quotation in question,
this definition does not seem to be very useful. Three grounds may be
offered to justify a definition of the "rules": (a) that this definition
was used explicitly by central bankers, or was commonly accepted dur-
ing the period under consideration; (b) that the definition, while not
being used in an explicit way, was implied by other principles which
7 "The concept of the rules of the game, which, incidentally, was first developed
in the post-1914 literature—indeed, as far as I know, the term itself was first used by
Keynes in the early twenties—admits of several possible interpretations and has been
used in several senses." (Bloomfield, Monetary Policy, p 47.)
8 Nurkse, International Currency Experience, p. 66.16 Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Policies
are known (or believed) to have been followed by policy makers; or
(c) that the definition is empirically found to have served as a guide-
line for policy actions during the relevant period.
Let us now examine the definition in question on these grounds.
It does not seem to be justified by the first criterion: the evidence of-
fered by eminent students of the classical gold-standard period sug-
gests that central bankers did not explicitly use such a definition, nor
was it commonly accepted or understood by them. On the last ground,
Nurkse's definition would have to be rejected on the basis of his own
evidence as well as that of Bloomfield. Nurkse himself found that the
"rules" were not actually followed in policy making in the interwar
years and Bloomfield found that they were not followed in the "classi-
cal" period either. We are left, thus, with the second ground. On this
ground the definition in question should again be rejected, and an al-
ternative definition could be formed along the following lines.
The accepted principle of central banking during the classical gold-
standard era was, presumably, the maintenance of a stable interna-
tional financial system; that is, a system free from (major) shifts in
foreign exchange rates and any form of state interference in the con-
duct of international transactions. Such a system cannot be viable if
countries lose all their gold and foreign exchange reserves. Any move-
ment of reserves from one country to the other would thus have to be
checked before the losing country's reserves are depleted. According
to the theory of the day this was to be accomplished by two factors:
(1) the "price-specie-flow" mechanism; and (2) the effect of interest
rate variations on international short-term capital movements. The
proper functioning of the latter factor would require the manipula-
tion of discount rates (or open-market operations) in an adjusting di-
rection. The operation of the former mechanism would require that
the reserve-losing country experience a downward movement of its
money supply, and the gaining country an upward movement. In
Nurkse's words: "The gold standard, or indeed any system of stable
exchange rates, is a system in which the quantity of money in each
country is determined primarily by the balance of payments."It is
an open question, however, how much the money supply should
change in each country. The more it changes, the faster the adjust-
9Nurkse,International Currency Experience, p.67.Approach, Concepts, and Methods 17
ment process will be. But certainly no one would expect this rule to
require a rapid approach of the money supply to zero in the losing
country, and to infinity in its partner. Even the most orthodox holders
of the view that money is but a "veil" were probably aware of the diffi-
culties created by changes in money supply, at least beyond a certain
point or pace. There must be, therefore, some "proper" change (or
rate of change) of the money supply. And there is no reason to sup-
pose that this "proper" magnitude is necessarily proportionate to the
change in foreign exchange reserves. Moreover, where foreign ex-
change reserves are considerable in relation to money supply, it may
well be that a change of a given proportion in these reserves will in it-
self, by its direct effect, change money supply more than the central
bank may deem proper for the necessary adjustment. In this situation,
the central bank may act to offset part of this direct effect without feel-
ing that it in any way violates some "rules of the game." The implica-
tion for the discount rate, however, is still clear. Since the end result
for the reserve-losing country should be some fall of the quantity of
money, interest rates must rise. Raising the discount rate serves this
purpose and is particularly efficient where (as in the classical case of
Britain) other interest rates traditionally follow discount rate move-
ments directly and immediately.
If this view is accepted, the "crucial" variables become money sup-
ply and the discount rate, rather than domestic assets of the central
bank. In the light of these remarks, it may be rewarding to examine
the issue of "automatic stabilization," to which Nurkse paid much at-
tention. He commented:
Whenever an inverse correlation is observed between a central bank's in-
ternational and domestic assets, it may be quite wrong to interpret it as a
deliberate act of neutralization on the part of that bank. It may well be due
to the bank's inaction rather than to its action. An inflow of gold, for instance,
tends to result in increased liquidity on the domestic money market, which in
turn may naturally lead the market to repay some of its indebtedness to the
central bank. The balance-sheet of the bank will show an increase in gold and
a decrease in domestic discounts and advances, and so the gold movement will
have been neutralized at least in part, even though the bank may have been
completely passive. Similarly, an outflow of gold, tending to reduce the funds
available to the market, may be partly offset by an increase in borrowing from
the central bank on the market's initiative. Even to prevent domestic assets
from changing in this way whenever gold flows in or out, would require18 Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Policies
definite action by the central bank either through changes in the terms of its
lending or through sales or purchases of securities designed to offset the auto-
matic responses in the market's indebtedness to the bank. To make domestic
assets change in a manner parallel to changes in the international reserve
would obviously demand a still greater degree of activity on the part of the
central bank. Failing such action, "automatic neutralization" may tend to be
the rule rather than the exception.°
According to the interpretation of the "rules of the game" previ-
ously suggested, it no longer follows that the "rules" not only require
the central bank to act to offset this tendency of the commercial banks
but even to effect "a still greater degree of activity." In certain in-
stances, where the direct decline in the economy's liquidity due to the
fall of foreign exchange reserves is regarded as too small for the proper
functioning of the price-specie-flow mechanism, such activity would
indeed be required. In other instances, the "rules" may induce the
central bank to offset only part of the "automatic neutralization." In
still other cases, no offsetting by the central bank may be required at
all. Moreover, if the direct decline of money supply is deemed larger
than "proper," the central bank may even be directed by the "rules"
to encourage some creation of money from domestic sources; that is,
the central bank may be called upon not only not to offset the "auto-
matic neutralization" of commercial banks, but even to act on its own
initiative in the same direction, so that an expansion of commercial
bank credit would partly offset the effect of the fall of foreign exchange
reserves on money supply.
It is thus clear that, following this interpretation of the "rules of
the game," the attempt to examine compliance with the "rules" by
observing correlations of movements of domestic and foreign assets of
the central bank would have to be abandoned. When foreign assets
fall, the "rules"—according to this interpretation—would generally ac-
cept either an increase or a decline of the central bank's domestic as-
sets. All that the "rules" require is that the quantity of money decrease
in the reserve-losing country and interest rates rise; and vice versa in
the gaining country.1
1Ibid.,p. 70.
iiForcomments along roughly the same lines see R. Triffin, "National Central
Banking and the International Economy," Review of Economic Studies, No. 36, 1946-
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The classical "rules of the game" have been discussed here in some
detail mainly because the mode of behavior prescribed by them may
still be expected to play a large role in policy making of central banks.
But it is, of course, entirely possible that other models serve as a guide
for policy. Thus, it is possible that the government may regard just the
discount rate, or just money supply as a crucial variable, and not both.
It may even disregard both, and attach crucial importance to the
availability of credit; or it may pay little attention altogether to purely
monetary variables and rely primarily on manipulation of the govern-
ment's excess demand. While the present study does not intend to dis-
cuss the merits of such alternative models—either on a priori grounds
or on the basis of the experience investigated—it will consider what
model, or what variable, assumed to be crucial, could explain any con-
sistent pattern of reactions which may be revealed.
The investigtion of each individual country will thus consist of a
discussion on two levels. First, each policy variable will be examined
separately to see if, by itself, it reveals any consistent adjusting be-
havior, or the opposite. Then, by way of summary and interpretation,
the observations of individual instruments will be combined to see
whether they imply any typical pattern of reactions, and whether this
pattern may be expected, in accordance with any reasonable model, to
be of an adjusting nature. These discussions of individual countries
will be preceded in each case by a section which will indicate, on the
basis of prior information, what the major instruments used in the
country are and the specific attributes of each instrument in that coun-
try, where this seems necessary for an understanding of the policy
mechanism.
5. Selection of Policy Instruments
The selection of policy instruments, or variables, for observation will
depend on the circumstances of each country. Differences in structure,
law, and tradition lead to the use of different instruments in different
countries. Here, statements of policy makers and of other analysts
may be helpful as guidelines for experimentation. If, for instance, the
magnitude of "secondary liquidity" is claimed to be of concern to the
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in the study of that country; in another country this variable would
be ignored, but the yield of government debt instruments might be
studied; and so on.
In addition to having been judged, from prior information, to offer
some promise of relevance, policy instruments will have to meet two
criteria to be included in a systematic study. First, they must be sub-
ject to at least rough quantification. This requirement rules out cer-
tain policy instruments which are used for balance-of-payments adjust.
ment. Direct control of imports is an important example: although
these restrictions (and their relaxation) have often been used to affect
the balance of payments, a quantitative measure of this variable is
hard to come by, and this instrument will be ignored. This is true
also of tariff duties: the size of individual duties can usually be
verified, but calculations of "average" tariff levels are rare and of
doubtful validity.
The other criterion which policy instruments must meet to be in-
cluded is that of continuous and systematic use. Since the purpose of
the study is to reveal a pattern—or even a change in pattern over time—
policies which belong to just one episode must be omitted even if they
can be quantified. Thus, for instance, if measures such as intervention
in the forward exchange market or taxing capital movements were
applied for a very few years of the total period, they cannot be the
subject of a study of a general policy pattern.
It will be clear, then, that the present study by no means purports
to describe and analyze the full array of instruments and measures
used for balance-of-payments adjustment. It will attempt a systematic
analysis only of policy instruments whose size can be measured and
which have been used frequently, rather than in single episodes. In
fact, as has been stated earlier, this means the major monetary and fis-
cal instruments which are intended primarily to affect aggregate de-
mand. The present study is thus confined to analyzing the use of
financial policies for balance-of-payments adjustment.12 During most
of the period studied, however, these policies were probably the most
52Touse the terminology recommended by Machlup, the study covers, by and
large, the instruments used for "real adjustment," to the exclusion of instruments
used for "compensatory corrections." See Fritz Machiup, "Adjustment in International
Payments," in Baldwin et al., Trade, Growth, and the Balance of Payments (Essays in
Honor of Gottfried Haberler), Amsterdam, 1965, pp. 185—213.
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important instruments used for balance-of-payments adjustment in
the countries in question.
A few instruments are common to most of the countries under in-
vestigation. These include the following: the discount rate, reserve-
ratio requirements, open-market operations, central bank lending
to the commercial banks, central bank lending to the government,
central bank total domestic claims, commercial bank lending to the
public, the money supply, government revenues, government expendi-
tures, and the government's budgetary balance. Most of these vari-
ables require no comment; but some may deserve a few words of ex-
planation.
Central Bank Lending to the Government.19 This magnitude is calcu-
lated on a net basis; that is, it represents the size of the net indebted-
ness(either positive or negative) of the government to the central
bank—derived by subtracting government deposits at the central bank
from its borrowing from the bank. Central bank credit to the govern-
ment increases the amount of liquidity in the economy only when it
is net lending. Suppose the government is granted a loan from the
bank but does not make any use of the receipts of its borrowing. This
would be reflected in an increase in the government's deposits at the
central bank equivalent in size to the loan. The loan does not affect
the economy's liquidity at all; and this fact would be truly reflected
in the size of the government's net indebtedness to the central bank,
which would remain unchanged. To cite another example: the econo-
my's liquidity would be affected in exactly the same way whether the
government finances a given amount of spending by a loan from the
central bank or by drawing upon existing deposits at the central bank.
Again, the government's net indebtedness to the bank would be in-
creased in exactly the same amount by these two alternative methods.
These examples demonstrate the general point that the contribution
of the government's transactions to the liquidity of the banking sys-
tem should be measured not by the gross term but by the amount of
net central bank lending to the government.
13Whenused in a general way, the term 'government" will refer, in this study, to
all official policy-making agencies; specifically, it will include the central bank. But in
discussions of the central bank vs. the "government," the latter should obviously be
interpreted in a narrower way—excluding the monetary authorities.22 Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Policies
Purchases of government securities by the central bank in the open
market would increase the amount of the government's gross and net
indebtedness to the bank, while sales in the open market would re-
duce it. The effect on commercial bank liquidity is, indeed, identical
whether the central bank purchases a newly issued government bond
direct from the government—provided the latter spends the proceeds—
or whether the bank buys in the market an existing government bond.
Where the central bank is in effect committed to buy government se-
curities from commercial banks, on given terms—as, for instance, in
the U.S. before the "accord" of 1951—there may indeed be little mean-
ing in separating the effect of open-market operations from that of
direct transactions between the central bank and the government. In
other instances—the U.S. since the early 1950's is probably a classic
example—open-market operations are clearly decided upon at the
discretion of the central bank and are used as an important instru-
ment of monetary policy. In these instances, open-market operations
would be recognized as a separate variable, while changes in the
government's net indebtedness to the central bank would exclude
variations in the amount of government paper at the central bank
which are due to open-market operations.
Central Bank Total Domestic Claims. Changes in this variable are
usually primarily a combination of changes in three other variables
which are recorded separately: central bank lending to the commer-
cial banks; central bank lending to the government; and open-mar-
ket operations. But they may also reflect other components, such as
central bank lending to the public (other than commercial banks). It
should also be noticed that, in line with the previous argument, central
bank lending to the government appears in this total on a net basis.
The "total" of domestic claims is thus a hybrid in which some com-
ponents are gross while one is net.'4
l4As was mentioned in the preceding section, Nurkse and Bloomfield attached pri-
mary importance to this variable of the central bank's total domestic claims in their
studies. They took into account gross, rather than net, claims of the central bank on
the government. The gap between the gross and net magnitudes may not have been
of major importance frequently; but at least in one instance, for France in the late
1920's, it must have been significant according to Nurkse's own evidence. Nurkse
noted, on this occasion: 'To the extent that neutralization occurred through the
growth of government deposits at the central bank, it cannot, of course, be observed
from a mere comparison of the Bank's international and domestic assets." (Inter-
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The Government's Revenues, Expenditures, and Budgetary Balance.
In the fiscal sphere, the major policy tool which one might expect to
be employed for purposes of balance-of-payments adjustment is prob-
ably an over-all (surplus or deficit) balance of the budget. This may
best be discussed in terms of the government's "excess demand" for
goods and services.' An increase in the government's excess demand—
whether an increase in a deficit, a reduction of a surplus, or a shift
from a surplus to a deficit—is a contribution to the economy's aggre-
gate demand, and thus an inflationary measure; and a reduction of
excess demand is the opposite. The investigation will thus examine
not the position of the government's balance (i.e., whether itis a
surplus or a deficit) but the direction of change in the balance from
one period to the other.
It may also be interesting to look separately at the changes in gov-
ernment revenues and government expenditures. If the government
does manipulate its excess demand in reaction to balance-of-payments
disturbances, this observation may show which tool is used for that
purpose; that is, whether it is mainly revenues which are changed or
expenditures, or possibly the two in opposite directions or different
proportions.
In a statistical study of this type, it is inevitably the cx post realized
movements of each policy variable which are taken into account.
These movements may, however, differ from the ex ante changes—the
realized movement is not necessarily identical with the one intended
by the policy maker. This difficulty almost certainly increases in im-
portance with the complexity of the process by which the policy var-
iable in question is brought into play.
Monetary variables differ as to the directness with which they can
be manipulated by the monetary authority. On the one hand, such
variables include instruments which are controlled directly and pre-
cisely by the authority, like the discount rate, minimum-reserve re-
quirements, or open-market operations. On the other hand, they in-
i5The"excess demand" is the excess of the government's expenditures on goods
and services over those of its revenues which reduce the publics disposable income.
In effect, the expenditures include very often loans to other organizations (whether
private or nationalized), the case for whose inclusion as an element in the govern.
ments "excess demand" is not clear. Also, the data actually used refer to cash
budgets, while the use of accrual budgets—had they been available—might be argued
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dude a variable such as money supply, which is affected by the mone-
tary authority only through a complex and long drawn out chain of
reactions.Itiscontinuously affected by exogenous, autonomous
changes, not all of which are immediately taken into account. In be-
tween are variables such as components of the central bank's assets,
or the supply of credit, which are at various stages of remove from
the direct action of the monetary authority. It may be debated at what
stage a variable is too little affected to be an "instrument" in mone-
tary policy.16 The advantage of examining variables at different levels,
as in the present study, is that it makes possible an analysis, as has
been explained in the preceding section, which is not tied in advance
to the investigation of one specific model.
This problem may be even more relevant for budgetary policies:
the identification of realized, ex post magnitudes with ex ante policies
might well be questioned. Thus a realized reduction in the govern-
16Challengedby a similar problem of determining what could be instruments of
monetary policy, Kareken and Solow stopped somewhat earlier on this road. They
argue: "It is not true, except in some irrelevant long-run sense, to say that the Fed-
eral Reserve controls either M [money supply] or its rate of change. What the Federal
Reserve can do is buy and sell in the open market, set reserve requirements, and set
the discount rate. A little less directly-.. wemay say that the authorities control
the effective primary reserves of the commercial banks.-- andat one further
remove we may say that the measure of monetary policy is the power of the banking
system to carry earning assets. This is what the monetary authorities do. They do not
move a pointer on a dial marked M or even SM." (John Kareken and Robert M.
Solow, "Lags in Monetary Policy," Part I of "Lags in Fiscal and Monetary Policy,"
Stabilization Policies, pp. 17—18.)
Later, however, the authors state: "Why stop, though, with the assumptions (or
attributions of knowledge) so far suggested? Why stop, that is, with Max E [maxi-
mum earning assets of commercial banks] as the instrument variable? Why not con-
tinue making assumptions until the ultimate policy variables, the price level, the
rate of unemployment, etc., emerge as the instrument variables of the Federal Re-
serve? Above it was suggested that the System can be regarded as knowing how the
direct determinants of total member bank reserves are themselves determined, and
as being able to predict future values of the arguments of these functions which it
does not set. But then why not assume in addition that the System knows member
banks' demand for excess reserves, in which case it can be regarded as setting actual
as well as maximum earning assets. And with a few more assumptions, the system
can be regarded as setting the price level.
"Evidently, there is no basis in logic for stopping at one point rather than an-
other—for making certain assumptions rather than others,.." (Ibid.,p. 81).
Indeed, with no basis in logic, the definition of instruments or the "assumptions"
we make may change from time to time and from one country to another. As stated
in the text, an advantage of always considering instruments on various "levels" is that
it imposes fewer restrictions, by an investigator, on the assumed mode of behavior of
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ment's excess demand in this investigation represents a contractive
policy, and a realized increase, an expansionary policy. It may be
argued that this is a particularly dubious procedure in this sphere;
that, for instance, when the government undertakes an expansionary
policy—say, by reducing tax rates without changing expenditures—the
ensuing expansion may lead to a budgetary surplus through its effect
on the amount of tax revenues. Identifying a budgetary surplus with
a contractive policy would be entirely misleading in this instance.
Such a contradiction between intended and realized budgetary bal.
ance—due merely to induced changes rather than to autonomous
changes in exogenous variables—would not be possible under the
"textbook" assumptions of multiplier analysis. Specifically, it would
not be possible when ex ante investment is held constant, or even as-
sumed to be a function of income. Under different assumptions, how-
ever, this contradiction is conceivable. It could be produced, for in.
stance, by an "acceleration principle," or by assuming investment to
be a function of tax rates, whether in general or certain corporate tax
rates.
Ideally, the anticipated budgetary balance should have been used
rather than the realized balance. However, this cannot be achieved in
practice. At best, estimates of this magnitude are available for a fiscal
year as a whole; even then, they do not necessarily reflect fully the
anticipations of policy makers. Estimates of planned budgets would
be of only little use for the purpose of this study. It is hoped that the
adoption of budgetary performance as a substitute for expected budg-
etary magnitudes will not bias the results seriously. This hope may be
justified when the periods of observation are not unduly long—say, not
more than a year or a year and a half. Within short periods, changes
induced by measures taken during the period may be expected to be
slight in comparison with the primary changes. Thus, the danger that
realized magnitudes will give indications contrary to those of intended
policies is probably small when the period is short. When partial, cir-
cumstantial evidence on the government's intentions is available, this
information will be indicated.
Unlike the monetary area, the study of fiscal policy is confined here
to the "ultimate" variables. It considers the government's over-all bal-
ance in its budget; one step below, it observes the two components of
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analyze the means by which each of these components is, in turn, af-
fected—means which could well be considered policy variables in their
own right. This treatment of the fiscal area results from the practical
limitations of the investigation. It is easy to tell how the discount rate
or the minimum-reserve ratio were changed during a given period. It
would be immensely more difficult to say how the "tax rate" changed.
This "tax rate" is some weighted average of a myriad of individual
tax rates, many of which may move in opposite directions in a given
period and certainly in different proportions. Even the study of entire
categories of these rates, e.g., excise duties or income taxes, would be
extremely complicated. A component such as the personal income tax
would in itself raise serious problems: it is a whole structure, not all
parts of which may move always in the same direction. In a study of
the present scope, any attempt to observe such "partial" variables in
a systematic manner must be abandoned.
It may seem odd that the foreign exchange rate, which is presum-
ably a major policy instrument among balance-of-payments adjust-
ment policies, is not mentioned among the policy variables in this
study. The reason for this is, of course, quite simple: in the countries
and during the period under investigation, changes in foreign exchange
rates were almost entirely absent. These changes were confined to a
few episodes in France and one each in Germany and the Netherlands
and offer no basis for systematic analysis. The present study is thus
defined beforehand, in practice, as an investigation of balance-of-pay-
ments adjustment policies under fixed exchange rates.
The important exception to this pattern in the Group of Ten is
Canada, which had a fluctuating rate during most of the period. Al-
though the study of Canada promises to be of considerable interest in
its own right, Canada's deviation from the general pattern makes it
less useful as an ingredient in international comparisons and a study
of international policy patterns. For this reason, Canada has been ex-
cluded from the present study.
6. Identification of Balance-of-Payments Disturbances
Since the study's purpose is to identify and examine the reactions of
governments to balance-of-payments disturbances through their poi-
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ideally,to indicate disturbances are those which serve this purpose in
the decision making process of the government concerned. The lack,
however, of direct information about these "ideal" variables makes
it necessary to substitute the researcher's judgment for that of the
government concerned and to experiment with alternative variables.
Since circumstances vary from one country to another, there should
be no attempt to determine a single exclusive principle for identify.
ing disturbances in all the countries studied. Where no particular spe-
cial circumstances are apparent, however, it would be a good rule to
stick as closely as possible to commonly accepted principles of identi-
fying disturbances, since these are likely to be adhered to by the gov-
ernment concerned. It should be obvious from these remarks that it
may be necessary to experiment with more than one definition or
principle, even in the case of a single country.
The variable which appears to be the simplest, most easily observed,
and most frequently available, is the country's external reserves. An
upward movement of these reserves would indicate an upward dis-
turbance, or a "surplus"; while a downward movement would be a
downward disturbance, or a "deficit." The category selected to repre-
sent this variable is that of gross official reserves. The definition of
this series usually includes holdings of gold and of foreign exchange
by the central bank or government plus the net IMF position.
Holdings of foreign exchange by commercial banks, on the other
hand, are probably not usually counted by the government as part of
the reserves for the purpose on hand. Before the era of convertibility,
banks in most countries were normally allowed to hold abroad only
necessary working balances. In later years, commercial banks have pre-
sumably been guided by their own initiative and considerations in de-
termining the amount of their foreign exchange holdings. They do
not act as agents of the central authorities; their holdings (and indebt-
edness), and changes in them, are thus presumably disregarded in the
government's identification of imbalances of payments.'7 Yet when
commercial bank holdings are substantial, it may be worthwhile to
experiment with including them in the country's reserves, for the pur-
pose of determining episodes of balance-of-payments disturbances. In
17Thisapproach is similar to that taken for the United States by the Bernstein
Committee. See Report of the Review Committee, Balance of Payments Statistics of
the United States: A Review and Appraisal, Washington, D.C., 1965, Chapter 9.28 Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Policies
the countries covered by the present report, this inclusion seemed,
usually, to affect the analysis very little.
Another series which has been experimented with is that of bal-
ance-of-payments surpluses and deficits as defined by the Balance-of-
Payments Division of the International Monetary Fund.'8 It covers
the period from 1958 onward, and uses the "official settlements" con-
cept: "A surplus or deficit is defined as the balance of all transactions
other than 'official settlements' (i.e., excluding changes in official gold
and foreign exchange assets, in net IMF positions, and in liabilities
to foreign monetary authorities, and adjusted for advance repayments
of foreign debt by governments). The over-all surplus or deficit so
defined is equal to the basic balance, unrecorded transactions, and all
movements of short-term capital, excluding only those that constitute
official settlements." 19 This definition thus includes not only changes
in a country's reserves but also changes in its liabilities to foreign
monetary authorities and advance repayments of foreign debt by gov-
ernments. The two series usually demonstate a very high degree of
agreement in direction of imbalances, and most often also in their in-
tensity, during the period covered by the two (that is, from 1958 on-
ward).
In some cases, it may be advisable to experiment with still other
variables. For instance, a government may view only an imbalance of
the current account as a "disturbance," while disregarding movements
on capital account. If this is suspected, the representation of disturb-
ances by deficits or surpluses on current account may be rewarding.
Still another variable which may have to be taken into account is the
level of reserves. A situation may occur where the government wishes
to see a change in reserves—an accumulation or, probably much less
often, a reduction. The government would not then consider any
change in reserves as a "disturbance" but any discrepancy between
the desired level of reserves and their actual level; or, in other words,
a change not commensurate with the change desired by the govern-
ment. The determination of a "desired level"is, of course, not an
easy task. When the level of reserves has been constant over the
long run, it may be assumed that a shortfall of reserves below this
level could be considered a downward disturbance even when reserves
18 This information was kindly provided by the Division.
'9 International Monetary Fund, 1965 Annual Report, p. 66.Approach, Concepts, and Methods 29
are rising (from a particularly low level), and vice versa. When re-
serves domonstrate a long-term movement, some form of determining
their trend would be required, and the assumption that the "trend
level" is the desired one may be attempted.
Most of the experiments that could be made will probably not be
required. Two guidelines will help to indicate the need for experi-
mentation: first, an explicit statement of policy makers, or of other
analysts, that a certain variable is used to measure balance-of-payments
disturbances—in which case the variable in question would merit an in-
vestigation; second, a lack of definite conclusions when the simple
variable of foreign exchange reserve holdings is analyzed.
The problem arising from the substitution of ex post for ex ante
magnitudes, which has been pointed out in the discussion of policy
variables, is just as relevant to the definition of targets in general,
and to the specific target of balance-of-payments equilibrium. The
study investigates relationships among realized movements of vari-
ables. Anticipations, on the other hand, are entirely absent from this
examination. In the government's "reaction function," manipulations
of policy variables will in effect be related to the present stock and
the anticipated, future flow of each magnitude that represents a tar-
get variable. Past flows enter into the function only as a factor which
affects these two. The statistical investigations can, in principle, take
account of present stocks; this will indeed be done as has just been
mentioned: the level of foreign exchange reserves will be introduced
whenever it seems to be a promising addition to the analysis. Antici-
pations, on the other hand, are replaced by the statistically observa-
ble flows which, in relation to each point of time in which a policy
measure is undertaken, have either taken place in the past or will have
been realized in effect in the future. This is certainly not a perfect sub-
stitute, but it is probably the best available. A conceivable alternative
would be to construct each government's "anticipation function," and
derive from it anticipated values for the target variables. This pro-
cedure might possibly be attempted, but it is certainly not feasible
in this study.
If it is found that the government does not react to "disturbances"
in the balance of payments in a way which would adjust them, this
could be the result of either of two factors. First, the government may
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the government's judgment, an undesirable impact on other targets.
And second, the government may be indifferent to the so-called dis-
turbance or may even actually welcome it. The double meaning of
the term "disturbance" should therefore be clarified. As used in this
study, "disturbance" does not necessarily indicate that the govern-
ment so regarded the development in question. The attempt to achieve
a certain level of reserves, which has just been mentioned, is an
important illustration of this point. If a level of reserves higher than
the existing one is considered a target, then not an accumulation of
reserves but its absence would be regarded, by the government, as a
"disturbance." It should therefore be emphasized that the use of this
term does not necessarily imply an expression of the government's
view: on the contrary, one of the outcomes of the study could be, to
identify what the government actually considered a disturbance by
examining the government's policies. Yet, it is just as important to
keep in mind that the study is intended to draw inferences for the
international monetary system as a whole. For the latter, the accumu-
lation of reserves by one country may be a "disturbance" even if it
is not so regarded by that country. And it is, therefore, imperative to
learn how that country reacted to such "disturbances."
7. Alternative Policy Targets
Policy targets may be of various kinds and shades, but most of them
could certainly not be identified without intensive study. It would
obviously not be feasible to try to secure information about all of
these targets; and for the present purpose such an attempt would
probably be unrewarding even if it were feasible. As explained ear-
lier, other target variables were introduced in this study mainly to
determine whether a policy pattern which appears to be a reaction to
imbalances of payments can be explained instead by their move-
ments. While the number of such explanations could be very large,
it seems that the observation of a few "global" targets which are
generally considered to share with the balance of payments a claim
on some of the same policy instruments would go a considerable way
toward satisfying the requirements of such an examination. These
targets are maintenance of price stability, maintenance of full employ-
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The observation of the first two targets is relatively simple. The in-
dexes of consumer prices and of wholesale prices appear to be used
most often as indicators of movements of the general price level.
Usually, although not always, these two indexes will yield similar
results, particularly as far as substantial price movements are con-
cerned. This is also true about measurements of unemployment. Al-
though series such as registered unemployment and the number of un-
employed projected from labor force surveys may differ significantly
when absolute levels are concerned, indicated directions and intensi-
ties of changes will be largely similar.
The statistical representation of the target of the rate of growth is
more complicated. This is, by its nature, a longer-term target. A meas-
urement of developments during a given period will inevitably reveal
the effect of (1) changes in the economy's productive resources and
the productivity of these resources—which is, presumably, what the
target of "growth" refers to—and (2) the rate of utilization of existing
capacity, in which the rate of employment, considered as a separate
target, is of crucial importance. The separation of actual performance
into these components would clearly be beyond the scope of a study
of this kind. The rate of growth will therefore have to be measured
by some summary indication of the current performance of the econ-
omy, despite the limitations just noted.
Conceptually, the best available yardstick for measuring the econ-
omy's over-all performance would probably be the rate of increase of
GNP (or NNP—the difference between the two will usually be slight).
For a number of reasons, however, a measure conforming better to the
purpose of this study is the rate of increase of industrial production.
In the first place, it is usually available within a fairly short time, un-
like the GNP estimates, which in most countries are available only
with a considerable time lag. It may thus be assumed that, for the pur-
pose of determining their short-term policies, governments which have
this measurement available at the relevant time regard it as indicat-
ing the growth rate. The government may justly feel that this use is
not likely to be very misleading, since industrial production is itself
a major component of the national product in the countries concerned.
Even aside from the advantage of being readily accessible, industrial
production data often attract particular attention. Industrial produc-
tion is more susceptible to the effects of short-term governmental poli-32 Balance-of-PaymentsAdjustment Policies
cies—and reflects them better—than do other economic activities, and
in particular those of the agricultural sector. Likewise, the industrial
sector is often assigned a particularly heavy weight, e.g., in compari-
son with the services sector, by governmental observers. For these rea-
sons, the index of industrial production will usually represent the
growth target in the present study.
Beyond the problem of what statistical series best represent the
various target variables, the question of how these series should be
interpreted must be raised. It must be assumed that a given change
(or position) of a series indicates a desirable movement (or level) for
the target on hand; while another position is undesirable and calls
for correction. The number of possible assumptions, i.e., of possible
modes of governmental views, may again be very large. Thus, where
the price stability target is concerned, any increase in the price level
(measured, for example, by the consumer price index) may be re-
garded as a disturbance which should be corrected. But if a general
upward trend of prices exists, it is possible that a price increase no
greater than the average is not a source of concern; or that faster in-
creases are not considered a disturbance as long as the price level is
below its "trend line"; or, as still another possibility, that only in-
creases in the rate of increase of prices are considered disturbances. A
similar variety of models is conceivable when unemployment is exam-
ined. When the rate of unemployment is high in comparison with
its average level, and rising, this would certainly be considered a dis-
turbance. It is not clear, however, how a situation in which unem-
ployment is high but falling would be regarded; or, to take the oppo-
site combination, how a situation of low but rising unemployment
should be treated. The same ambiguity holds when the growth target
is examined. A situation where industrial production is both below its
"trend line" and falling would, almost certainly, be regarded as a dis-
turbance. The answer is not clear, however, when the rate of increase
is above average, but production is still below its trend level, or when
the rate of increase is falling, but production is above its trend level;
and so on.
It would be next to impossible to try to examine all such possibili-
ties. In any case, it should be recalled that the study does not pur-
port to investigate all the possible targets, and cannot therefore be
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examined.In general, it will be assumed that price stability is con-
travened when prices rise more rapidly than in recent experience;
that the target of high employment is contravened by an increase in
unemployment; and that a decline in the rate of increase of industrial
production (and, needless to say, a negative rate) indicates a deteri-
oration of the target of rapid growth. In the countries which have been
investigated, it appears from casual observation that other reasonable
models would most often have given similar indications about the
timing of disturbances. In some cases where these indications are
clearly contradictory, this will be taken into account informally. How-
ever, it should again be emphasized that it cannot be claimed that
the result of this procedure is based on an exhaustive and definitive
study of all reasonable possibilities. It is limited, as has been stated
earlier, to the examination of a very limited number of the simplest,
and probably most obvious, among these possible models.